On the Crowding-Out Effects of Tax-Financed Charitable Contributions by the Government by Alan Krause
Discussion Papers in Economics





On the Crowding-Out Effects of Tax-Financed Charitable Contributions by the 
Government
By
Alan Krause (University of York)On the Crowding-Out E⁄ects of Tax-Financed





An important question in the literature on charitable contributions is the ex-
tent to which tax-￿nanced contributions by the government crowd out private
contributions. This paper examines a simple model of charitable contributions in
which there exist both warm-glow and public good motives for giving, but where
the warm-glow motive is competitive in the sense that individuals evaluate their
own contribution relative to that of their peers. It is shown that the competitive
element of the warm-glow motive may exacerbate or attenuate the crowding-out
e⁄ect, depending upon certain preference and income parameters. However, as
the warm-glow motive for giving becomes purely competitive, crowding out is
exacerbated and is almost dollar-for-dollar.
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The literature on charitable contributions, or more generally private contributions to
a public good, has identi￿ed two key motives for giving. The ￿rst is an altruistic or
public good motive, which is based on the idea that individuals care about the level
of the public good. Individuals therefore give to charity in order to increase the total
level of contributions. However, since individuals care only about the level of contri-
butions, and not the source of the contributions, free-riding may become problematic.
Indeed, an important result in the literature is that tax-￿nanced contributions by the
government completely crowd out private contributions (see, e.g., Sugden [1982], Warr
[1982], Roberts [1984], Bergstrom, et al. [1986], and Andreoni [1988]). The second key
motive put forward for giving is known as the warm-glow motive. The idea here is that
individuals obtain utility or a ￿warm-glow￿from the act of giving itself. In this case,
individuals do care about the source of the contribution￿ they prefer, ceteris paribus,
that they make the contribution. As a result, Andreoni [1989, 1990] shows that crowding
out is incomplete when there exist both warm-glow and public good motives for giving.
In this paper, we extend the warm-glow motive to include a competitive element.
That is, we assume that individuals evaluate the utility from their own charitable con-
tribution relative to the contributions made by their peers. The idea is that individuals
like to see themselves as being relatively generous. For example, one can imagine feeling
better about making a $10 contribution to charity if others are giving $5 than when
others are giving $20. Apart from being intuitively appealing, there is also empiri-
cal evidence that suggests individual contributions can be positively in￿ uenced by the
contributions of others; see for example Glazer and Konrad [1996], Harbaugh [1998b],
Andreoni and Petrie [2004], and Rege and Telle [2004]. This is one reason why charities
often publicise the names of their major donors and the size of the contribution.
Our main ￿nding is that the competitive element of the warm-glow motive for giving
may exacerbate or attenuate the crowding-out e⁄ect, depending upon certain preference
and income parameters. The intuition is that competitive warm-glow preferences make
individuals more reluctant to reduce their giving in response to higher taxation, since
2each individual cares about how their contribution compares with others. This acts
to attenuate the crowding-out e⁄ect. However, the negative externality that individual
giving imposes on others means that private contributions are higher than they otherwise
would be. So suppose the government imposes a tax on individual i, which forces her
to reduce her charitable contribution. This weakens the negative externality that her
giving imposes on others, which allows the other individuals to reduce their own giving.
This, in turn, weakens the negative externality that their giving imposes on individual i,
which allows individual i to further reduce her giving, and so on. If these second-round
e⁄ects are strong enough, crowding out is exacerbated despite the initial reluctance
individuals have to reduce their giving. Indeed, when the warm-glow motive is almost
purely competitive so that the negative-externality e⁄ect is extreme, crowding out is
almost dollar-for-dollar. That is, the fall in private contributions is almost equal to the
tax-￿nanced increase in the government￿ s contribution.
The papers most closely related to ours are those by Glazer and Konrad [1996],
Harbaugh [1998a], Romano and Yildirim [2001], Duncan [2004], and Blumkin and Sadka
[2007]. The papers by Glazer and Konrad [1996], Harbaugh [1998a], and Blumkin and
Sadka [2007] all consider a prestige motive for giving. However, their focus is on the use of
charitable contributions to signal social status and/or the implications for the crowding-
out hypothesis are not explored.1 Moreover, unlike the prestige motive for giving, our
competitive warm-glow motive is still ￿warm-glow￿in spirit; it is just that individuals
measure their warm-glow from giving against the giving of others. Our competitive
warm-glow motive is therefore an example of ￿keeping up with the Joneses￿preferences.
Romano and Yildirim [2001] also allow for a prestige-like motive for giving, but their
focus is on the strategic behaviour of donors and charitable organisations. Duncan
[2004] develops an ￿impact￿ theory of philanthropy, in which individuals care about
1In Glazer and Konrad [1996] charitable contributions are made to signal wealth, and they ￿nd
that crowding out is incomplete. Harbaugh [1998a] and Blumkin and Sadka [2007] do not consider the
crowding-out hypothesis. Harbaugh [1998a] focuses on the behaviour of charitable organisations rather
than donors, while Blumkin and Sadka [2007] show that the optimal tax on charitable contributions
is non-negative when it is chosen as part of an optimal redistributive tax system. Saez [2004] and
Diamond [2006] also examine the taxation/subsidisation of charitable contributions as part of optimal
redistributive tax systems.
3the e⁄ectiveness of their donations.2 In his model, individual giving imposes a negative
externality on others since under an assumption of diminishing returns, individual giving
reduces the marginal e⁄ectiveness of additional contributions. Interestingly, Duncan
[2004] shows, amongst other things, that tax-￿nanced charitable contributions by the
government can crowd in private contributions.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model,
while Section 3 examines the crowding-out hypothesis. Section 4 concludes, while proofs
are relegated to an appendix.
2 A Simple Model
There are two individuals and a government. Individual i chooses her own consumption
ci and her contribution to charity gi to maximise the utility function:
u(ci) + ￿iv(gi ￿ ￿igj) + (1 ￿ ￿i)z(G + T) (2.1)
subject to the budget constraint:
ci + gi ￿ mi ￿ ￿i (2.2)
where the functions u(￿), v(￿) and z(￿) are increasing and strictly concave. Total con-
tributions to charity are denoted by G + T, where G = gi + gj is total contributions
by individuals i and j, while T is total contributions by the government. Following the
standard practice, we assume that T = ￿i + ￿j, where ￿i and ￿j are lump-sum taxes
imposed on individuals i and j, respectively. Individual i￿ s pre-tax income is denoted
by mi. The parameter ￿i 2 (0;1) represents the weight that individual i places on the
warm-glow motive for giving, where ￿i 2 [0;1) measures the extent to which individual
i evaluates her own charitable contribution relative to that of individual j. The weight
individual i places on the public good motive for giving is (1 ￿ ￿i). It can be seen
2See also Duncan [2009]. A similar idea to impact philanthropy has recently been developed by
Atkinson [2009] to explain the prevalence of giving for overseas development.
4that individual j￿ s charitable contribution imposes a negative externality on individual
i through the ￿competitive￿warm-glow motive for giving, but it also generates a pos-
itive externality through the public good motive. It can also be seen that if ￿i = 0,
our competitive warm-glow motive reduces to the standard warm-glow motive, in which
utility from giving is modelled in the same manner as utility from an individual￿ s own
consumption.
Assuming that the budget constraint (2.2) binds at an optimum, it can be solved
for ci and substituted into the utility function (2.1). It is also assumed (i.e., we make
the Nash conjecture) that each individual takes the charitable contribution of the other
individual as given. The ￿rst-order condition on gi for an interior maximum can then
be written as:
￿u
0(mi ￿ ￿i ￿ gi) + ￿iv
0(gi ￿ ￿igj) + (1 ￿ ￿i)z
0(G + T) = 0 (2.3)
Likewise, individual j will solve a programme exactly analogous to (2:1) ￿ (2:2). The
￿rst-order condition on gj for an interior maximum is:
￿u
0(mj ￿ ￿j ￿ gj) + ￿jv
0(gj ￿ ￿jgi) + (1 ￿ ￿j)z
0(G + T) = 0 (2.4)
It is straightforward to show that the second-order conditions for a maximum corre-
sponding to equations (2.3) and (2.4) are satis￿ed.
Suppose hgi;mi;￿i;￿i;￿i;gj;mj;￿j;￿j;￿ji is a solution to equations (2.3) and (2.4).
Then by the Implicit Function Theoremthere exist functions gi = gi(mi;￿i;￿i;￿i;mj;￿j;￿j;￿j)
and gj = gj(mi;￿i;￿i;￿i;mj;￿j;￿j;￿j) that solve (2.3) and (2.4). The following propo-
sition summarises the e⁄ect that the competitive element of the warm-glow motive for
giving has on the level of charitable contributions:
Proposition 1 An increase in ￿i (resp. ￿j) results in an increase in gi (resp. gj) and
in total private contributions, but the e⁄ect on gj (resp. gi) is ambiguous.
The proof of Proposition 1 is provided in the Appendix, but the intuition behind the
result is fairly straightforward. An increase in ￿i will, all else equal, increase the marginal
utility individual i obtains from giving. Accordingly, individual i increases her charitable
5contribution. This encourages individual j to increase her own contribution, through the
competitive warm-glow motive. But simultaneously, individual i￿ s higher contribution
increases total contributions, which entices individual j to lower her contribution vis-a-
vis the public good motive. Therefore, the e⁄ect of an increase in ￿i on gj is ambiguous,
although the e⁄ect on total private contributions is always positive.
3 Crowding Out
An important question in the literature on charitable contributions is the extent to
which tax-￿nanced contributions by the government crowd out private contributions.
Following the standard practice, we assume that the government increases its taxation
of one of the individuals, in our case individual i, and we then examine the e⁄ect this




@￿i = ￿1, i.e., crowding out is complete.
Remark 2 If ￿i = ￿j = 0, then
@G(￿)
@￿i 2 (￿1;0), i.e., crowding out is incomplete.
Remark 1 is the well-known result that crowding out is dollar-for-dollar when there
is only the public good motive for giving.3 Remark 2 is the main contribution of An-
dreoni [1989, 1990] that crowding out is less than dollar-for-dollar when there are both
(standard) warm-glow and public good motives for giving.
Our main interest is how the competitive element of the warm-glow motive for giving
a⁄ects the extent of crowding out. To this end, we assume that the individuals￿utility
functions take the Cobb-Douglas form:
ln(ci) + ￿i ln(gi ￿ ￿igj) + (1 ￿ ￿i)ln(G + T) (3.1)
ln(cj) + ￿j ln(gj ￿ ￿jgi) + (1 ￿ ￿j)ln(G + T) (3.2)
for individuals i and j, respectively. We then conduct some numerical simulations, which
are illustrated in Figures 1 ￿5.
3See in particular Bergstrom, et al. [1986], and Andreoni [2006] for a discussion of the literature and
some related ￿neutrality￿results.
6In each ￿gure, the horizontal axis shows the tax imposed on individual i, while the
vertical axis shows the change in private giving (denoted ￿G). The dashed line indicates
complete (dollar-for-dollar) crowding out, which would be the case if there were only the
public good motive for giving. Points above the dashed line correspond to incomplete
crowding out. The solid lines in each ￿gure illustrate the extent of crowding out with
standard (￿i = ￿j = 0) and competitive (￿i 6= 0;￿j 6= 0) warm-glow preferences. Taken
together, Figures 1 ￿5 show that the competitive element of the warm-glow motive
for giving may exacerbate or attenuate the crowding-out e⁄ect, depending upon the
preference and income parameters.
In Figure 1, individuals i and j are assumed to be identical, except in the left panel
they place more weight on the public good motive for giving (￿i = ￿j = 0:25), while in
the right panel they place more weight on the warm-glow motive (￿i = ￿j = 0:75). When
the public good motive dominates, it can be seen that competitive warm-glow (hence-
forth, CWG) preferences attenuate the crowding-out e⁄ect. This is because free-riding is
relatively extensive when the public good motive dominates, but CWG preferences imply
that each individual now cares about the relative size of their contribution. Hence, CWG
preferences reduce free-riding and attenuate the crowding-out e⁄ect. However, when the
warm-glow motive for giving dominates, CWG preferences exacerbate the crowding-out
e⁄ect. In this case, free-riding is minimal and each individual￿ s contribution is relatively
large, which is made larger still by CWG preferences. Thus the negative externality that
each individual￿ s giving imposes on the other is substantial. A tax on individual i which
forces her to reduce her giving weakens the negative externality imposed on individual
j, allowing individual j to reduce her own contribution. This, in turn, weakens the
negative externality imposed on individual i, allowing individual i to further reduce her
contribution, and so on. The end result is that crowding out is exacerbated.
In Figure 2, the individuals are distinguished by the weight they place on the warm-
glow versus public good motives for giving. In the left panel, individual i places more
weight on the warm-glow motive and individual j places more weight on the public
good motive. In this case, CWG preferences exacerbate the crowding-out e⁄ect. Since
individual i is giving mainly due to the warm-glow motive, while individual j is giving
7mainly due to the public good motive, individual i￿ s giving is much larger than that of
individual j. This gives individual i plenty of scope to reduce her giving in response
to higher taxation, since the negative externality imposed on her by individual j is
relatively weak. Moreover, since individual i￿ s giving is relatively large, the negative
externality it imposes on individual j is substantial. Thus the reduction in individual i￿ s
giving weakens the (substantial) negative externality imposed on individual j, allowing
individual j to reduce her own giving. This, in turn, allows further rounds of reductions,
with the end result being that crowding out is exacerbated. In the right panel of Figure 2,
however, individual i places more weight on the public good motive than does individual
j, and CWG preferences attenuate the crowding-out e⁄ect. In this case, individual j
is giving more than individual i, meaning that the negative externality individual j￿ s
giving imposes on individual i is substantial. Accordingly, individual i is more reluctant
to reduce her giving in response to higher taxation, the end result being that crowding
out is attenuated.
In Figure 3, the individuals are distinguished by the intensity of their CWG prefer-
ences. In the left panel, the intensity is greater for individual i (￿i = 0:75;￿j = 0:25),
while the right panel shows the opposite case. When individual i￿ s CWG preferences
are more intense, crowding out is attenuated. This is because individual i is reluctant
to reduce her giving in response to higher taxation, because she cares considerably as to
how her giving compares with that of individual j. Furthermore, the (modest) reduction
in individual i￿ s giving has little e⁄ect on individual j, because individual j cares little
about how her giving compares with that of individual i. Therefore, the fall in total
private contributions is relatively small and crowding out is attenuated. By an analo-
gous argument, crowding out is exacerbated when individual i￿ s CWG preferences are
less intense. In this case, individual i is more willing to reduce her giving in response to
higher taxation, since she cares relatively less about how her giving compares with that
of individual j. The decrease in individual i￿ s giving reduces the negative externality
imposed on individual j, which is relatively strong since individual j cares considerably
as to how her giving compares with that of individual i. This allows individual j to
reduce her giving, which leads to further rounds of reductions. In the end, crowding out
8is exacerbated.
In Figure 4, the individuals are distinguished by their incomes. In the left panel,
individual i has the higher income, while in the right panel individual j￿ s income is
larger. When individual i is the high-income individual, CWG preferences exacerbate
the crowding-out e⁄ect. In this case, since individual j has a low income, her giving is
low and therefore the negative externality it imposes on individual i is weak. This gives
individual i plenty of scope to reduce her giving in response to higher taxation. Also,
since individual i has a high income, her giving is large and it imposes a substantial nega-
tive externality on individual j. The reduction in individual i￿ s giving, therefore, allows
individual j to make a signi￿cant reduction in her own giving. In the end, crowding
out is exacerbated. When individual j is the high-income individual, CWG preferences
attenuate the crowding-out e⁄ect, although for the parameters chosen the attenuation
is marginal.4 Since individual j has the higher income, her giving is substantial and
it imposes a strong negative externality on individual i. Accordingly, individual i is
reluctant to reduce her giving in response to higher taxation. Moreover, since individual
i￿ s income is low, her giving is low and the negative externality it imposes on individual
j is weak. Therefore, individual j does not make much of a reduction in her own giving
in response to the (modest) decline in individual i￿ s giving. The end result is that the
fall in total private giving is relatively small, and crowding out is attenuated.
Figure 5 examines the same situation as Figure 1, except in Figure 5 competitive
warm-glow preferences are almost purely competitive in the sense that ￿i = ￿j = 0:98.5
For both cases considered (￿i = ￿j = 0:25 and ￿i = ￿j = 0:75), CWG preferences now
exacerbate the crowding-out e⁄ect. Indeed, crowding out is almost dollar-for-dollar,
and crowding out is worse when more weight is placed on the warm-glow motive for
giving. The reason is that the negative externality that each individual￿ s giving imposes
on the other is extreme, causing each individual￿ s charitable contribution to be much
higher (in fact, more than double) than it otherwise would be. The tax imposed on
4It is not possible to increase the di⁄erence in the individuals￿incomes in order to make the e⁄ect
of CWG preferences clearer, because this would result in gi ￿ ￿igj being negative.
5It is not possible to consider ￿i = ￿j = 0:99, because this would result in gi ￿ ￿igj being negative.
9individual i which forces her to reduce her giving allows individual j to make a substantial
reduction in her own giving. This leads to further rounds of reductions, with total
private contributions falling by almost the same amount as the tax-￿nanced increase in
contributions by the government.
4 Closing Remarks
Traditional models of private contributions to a public good (such as a charity), as
exempli￿ed by Bergstrom, et al. [1986], conclude that tax-￿nanced contributions by the
government completely crowd out private contributions. But when a warm-glow motive
for giving is added, Andreoni [1989, 1990] shows that crowding out is incomplete. In
this paper, we have extended the warm-glow motive to include a competitive element,
in order to capture the idea that individuals feel better about giving when they give
more than others. Our main ￿nding is perhaps surprising, in that the competitive
element of the warm-glow motive has an ambiguous e⁄ect on the extent of crowding
out. This is because, on the one hand, CWG preferences imply that individuals are more
reluctant to reduce their giving. But on the other hand, any reduction in giving weakens
the negative externality that individual giving imposes on others, which allows further
rounds of reductions. Accordingly, CWG preferences may exacerbate or attenuate the
crowding-out e⁄ect, depending upon preferences and income.
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The Hessian associated with equations (2.3) and (2.4) is:
H =
2
4u00(ci) + ￿iv00(gi ￿ ￿igj) + (1 ￿ ￿i)z00(G + T) ￿￿i￿iv00(gi ￿ ￿igj) + (1 ￿ ￿i)z00(G + T)




10The determinant of H is given by:
j H j= u
00(ci)[u
00(cj) + ￿jv




00(cj) + (1 + ￿i)(1 ￿ ￿j)z
00(G + T)]
+ (1 ￿ ￿i)z
00(G + T)[u
00(cj) + (1 + ￿j)￿jv
00(gj ￿ ￿jgi)]
+ (1 ￿ ￿i￿j)￿iv
00(gi ￿ ￿igj)￿jv
00(gj ￿ ￿jgi) > 0 (A.2)










￿iv00(gi ￿ ￿igj)gj [￿j￿jv00(gj ￿ ￿jgi) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿j)z00(G + T)]
j H j
T 0 (A.4)




@￿i > 0. The proof for an
increase in ￿j is analogous. ￿
Proof of Remarks 1 and 2
































00(ci) + (1 ￿ ￿i)z
00(G + T)] < 0
(A.7)









@￿i , with ￿i = ￿j = 0. ￿
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Crowding Out: Identical Individuals 
 
0.25 i λ = , 100 = i m ,  0.25 j λ = ,  100 = j m ,  0 τ = j  
 








Crowding Out: Individuals Distinguished by  i λ  and  j λ  
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Crowding Out: Individuals Distinguished by  i α  and  j α  
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Crowding Out: Individuals Distinguished by  i m  and  j m  
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Crowding Out: Identical Individuals 
 
0.25 i λ = , 100 = i m ,  0.25 j λ = ,  100 = j m ,  0 τ = j  
 
0.75 i λ = , 100 = i m ,  0.75 j λ = ,  100 = j m ,  0 τ = j  
 
 